Chemical Weapons Agreement

Several other BTWC States Parties have been accused by other States or are suspected of exploring, developing and/or producing biological weapons. These accusations have been brought in a large number of situations, including formal meetings of States parties (review conferences), speeches and public reports issued by the accusing country or non-governmental organizations. Due to the lack of publicly available evidence, it is difficult to determine the true extent of the activities and whether they cross the line between legitimate defence programmes and violations of the Convention. However, it is certain that the history of non-compliance and the real possibility of continuing prohibited activities are perhaps the greatest threats to btwc. A Party may declare a “small single facility” that produces up to one tonne of List 1 chemicals annually for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes, and another facility may also produce 10 kg per year for protection testing purposes. An unlimited number of other facilities may produce Category 1 chemicals with a total annual limit value of 10 kg for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes, but any facility producing more than 100 grams must be declared. [14] [18] On March 13, 2018, the OPCW announced the destruction of Iraqi chemical weapons remnants. There are several agreements that duplicate the CWC`s mandate. For example, the Australia Group (AG) coordinates CW-related export controls and encourages the exchange of information between its 32 member countries. The Proliferation Security Initiative aims to prevent the transfer of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical weapons. More broadly, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requires all states to take all possible measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In some cases, such as the Australia Group, countries face conflict between mandates. For example, some states complain that the GA restricts free trade in chemicals and chemical processes to CWC members, who have a good reputation with the OPCW and CWC.

The destruction of CWPF likely to produce List 1 chemicals must begin within one year of the entry into force of the CWC for a State. States Parties that had signed the Treaty upon its initial entry into force were required to conclude the CWPF producing List 1 chemicals by 29 April 2007. The Second Review Conference was held from 8 to 26 September 1986. The number of members of the BTWC had grown to more than 100, including the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States). Scientific and technological progress has raised questions about the scope of the Convention. Accusations of non-compliance dominated the conference. In particular, there have been many persistent questions about the appearance of anthrax that took place in the Soviet city of Svrdlovsk in 1979 and about allegations of use of the toxin “yellow rain” in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. The United States accused the Soviet Union of conducting an offensive biological weapons program on its territory and of participating in the development, production, transfer and use of toxins for hostile purposes elsewhere. Negotiations on the ad hoc group began in January 1995 under the chairmanship of Hungarian Ambassador Tibor Tóth. The first two and a half years of the negotiations were spent identifying elements to be included in the protocol.

In July 1997, a “rolling text” was put in place to identify the proposals made so far and to become the basis for the group`s work for the next four years. Negotiations on the “rolling text” eventually slowed down and States Parties began the difficult process of resolving outstanding issues. . . .